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Abstract
We examine a unique dataset of Dutch companies, some of which have received venture
ﬁnancing. The data include detailed information on innovation activities and other
company characteristics. We analyse the role of venture ﬁnance in inﬂuencing inno-
vation strategies. We ﬁnd that venture capitalists push portfolio companies towards
building absorptive capacity and towards more permanent in-house R&D eﬀorts. By
contrast, we ﬁnd that public funding relaxes ﬁnancial constraints, but does not lead
to a build-up of absorptive capacity. Our results thus highlight the special role of
venture capital in shaping companies’ innovation strategies.
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any errors.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Venture capital is a specialized form of ﬁnancial intermediation whose success in supporting
innovative companies through the provision of ﬁnance and monitoring and advice services
has generated much research.
The active role of venture capitalists in portfolio companies has been documented
by several studies (e.g., Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2005), Gorman and Sahlman
(1989), Lerner (1995)). In particular, studies have documented that venture capital speeds
up product commercialization (Hellmann and Puri (2000)) and the adoption of human re-
source policies (Hellmann and Puri (2002)), and that it strengthens companies’ commer-
cialization strategies (Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2002), Hsu (2006)). However, we still know
very little about how exactly venture capital contributes to companies’ strategic behavior
at the earlier stage when the innovative process at portfolio companies takes shape.
In this paper we contribute to this literature by focussing on one aspect that bridges
the industrial organization, management, and ﬁnance literatures and that has not been
explored so far. This concerns how venture capital inﬂuences the way companies integrate
new knowledge into the innovation process by combining diﬀerent inputs. Our study
is thus the ﬁrst to look directly into how venture capital contributes to the innovation
strategies of portfolio companies.
The role of venture capital in this context is potentially very important. Venture
capital ﬁrms are sophisticated investors, whose partners have extensive knowledge of the
industry and often previous managerial experience. Their strong commitment to generate
high returns in the medium term makes them active investors (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hell-
mann (2007)). They could therefore ‘make the diﬀerence’ by eﬀectively steering portfolio
companies’ innovation strategy towards commercial success.
There are two possible, though opposite, views of venture capital’s role in shaping
portfolio companies’ innovation strategy. One is that venture investors are particularly
good at timing market conditions (see Gompers et al. (2007)). They would invest in
companies at the ‘right’ time with the goal to take them public (or sell them to an industrial
acquirer) at the ‘right’ moment, thus freeing their capital to re-invest it in new ventures
(Michelacci and Suarez (2004)). In addition, the certiﬁcation role of venture investors
(Megginson and Weiss (1991)) and their networks of relationships (Hochberg, Ljungqvist,
and Lu (2007)) would contribute to attract companies which already have good growth
opportunities (Sørensen (2006)), so that venture investors would mainly need to bring them
to a successful exit. Venture capital would therefore ﬁnance companies whose innovation
strategies are already well developed, with the perspective of turning them soon into ‘cash
cows’ (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002)).
1An alternative view is that venture investors are ‘company builders’ who inﬂuence
innovation as much as professionalization and commercialization strategies. This view,
based on the double moral hazard model of venture capital of Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997)1, stresses the active role of venture capitalists as mentors and monitors of inexpe-
rienced entrepreneurs (Baker and Gompers (2003), Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Lerner
(1995)). Venture investors would therefore provide teams of entrepreneurs with ﬁnance
but also with non-ﬁnancial services like monitoring, support, and advice, in order to create
successful commercial ventures. The eﬀect of venture ﬁnance would in this case extend
across several strategic dimensions, as documented in the case of product commercializa-
tion (Hellmann and Puri (2000)), human resource policies (Hellmann and Puri (2002)),
and commercialization alliances (Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2002), Hsu (2006)). Whether
venture ﬁrms would aﬀect strategies at the innovation stage remains an open question.
Verifying which of these two views is closer to reality is important both from a man-
agement and from a policy. This is the purpose of our study. We base our analysis on the
concept of absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity, deﬁned as the ‘capacity to assimilate
and exploit new knowledge,’ is a concept introduced by the seminal contribution of Co-
hen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) and further formalized by Kamien and Zang (2000) and
Zahra and George (2002). Particularly important in our context, is that many successful
innovation have been favored by the ability to build absorptive capacity. The underlying
idea is that R&D activities have two diﬀerent eﬀects. One is to directly generate new
innovations, the other is to provide companies with the ability to identify, evaluate, and
absorb internally diﬀerent forms of know-how which has been generated outside the ﬁrm.
By investing in the build-up of absorptive capacity through in-house R&D, companies
may therefore increase their ability to generate future innovations by remaining actively
tuned on what others are doing and ready to exploit the opportunities that scientiﬁca n d
technological advances create.
From a management perspective, absorptive capacity is then a major factor under-
lying companies’ ability to combine external sources of knowledge for the production of
innovative products. As argued by Cockburn and Henderson (1998), Freeman (1991), and
Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996), the combination of internal and external sources of
knowledge is an important factor in explaining many successful innovations. The econo-
metric analyses of Arora and Gambardella (1990, 1994) further strengthened this point
by showing that internal know-how is important both for screening external know-how
and for incorporating it into innovations. Moreover, Levin and Reiss (1988) and Veugelers
(1997) show that the ability to incorporate external know-how further increases the level
1See also Casamatta (2003), Hellmann (2006), and Schmidt (2004).
2of internal R&D. As Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) argue, understanding which variables
lead to a build-up of absorptive capacity, would then help making the innovation process
a ‘manageable source of sustainable competitive advantage.’ They focus on the role of
a company being closely linked to universities and research centers, while we focus on a
company’s ability to attract venture capital investors.
Understanding factors conducive to the accumulation of absorptive capacity is impor-
tant also from a policy perspective. Griﬃth, Redding, and van Reenen (2004) provide
country-level evidence of the importance of absorptive capacity for productivity growth.
In other words, absorptive capacity matters for the success of the individual ﬁrm but
also for economic growth. Leahy and Neary (2007) formally model the innovation process
to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of alternative public policies, and conclude that absorptive
capacity makes subsidies to R&D more eﬃcient than those to research joint ventures.
Many countries spend large amounts of public money on promoting venture capital
(Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006), Di Giacomo (2004)). One of the tenets of such
active public policies is that helping the creation of national venture capital industries
increases the amount of innovative R&D and contributes to economic growth through the
creation of knowledge spillovers (Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003)). Clearly, a positive role
of venture investors for the accumulation of absorptive capacity by portfolio companies
would contribute to justify these policies, while the opposite result would suggest a waste
of taxpayers’ money.
On these bases, we ask how venture ﬁnance inﬂuences the absorption of new knowledge
through the combination of two diﬀerent innovation activities (R&D ‘make’ and ‘buy’).
More precisely, following Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), we deﬁne exclusive combinations
of these activities which deﬁne alternative innovation strategies, and focus on how venture
capital aﬀects the joint adoption of both make and buy–which corresponds to the build-
up to absorptive capacity. This is an important question since it goes to the heart of how
venture ﬁnancing might contribute to the innovation process.
We therefore provide a novel contribution to a recent literature that has so far focussed
on the role of venture capital in the commercialization stage of innovations. Recent stud-
ies have started examining how venture capital investors contribute to the formation of
cooperative alliances for the commercial exploitation of innovations (Gans, Hsu, and Stern
(2002) and Hsu (2006), using US data), and in ‘explorative’ formal R&D alliances by a
sample of Italian ﬁrms (Colombo, Grilli, and Piva (2006), using Italian data) In a related
stand of literature, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) look at the relationship between R&D
cooperation and knowledge spillovers, and Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) look at the
determinants of the complementarity among ‘make’ and ‘buy’ innovation activities and
3using Belgian data. We build also on these studies by including venture investors as a
relevant determinants of absorptive capacity.
We base our analysis on a unique database of over 7,800 Dutch companies. The Nether-
lands is a country with both a high level of innovation and a vital venture capital market
and therefore represents a suitable case for our study. We assemble our dataset using
detailed ﬁrm-level information on innovation activities from the Community Innovation
Survey data provided by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). We supplement
these data with information on venture ﬁnancing from VentureXpert, the leading com-
mercial database for venture ﬁnance, and with application-level patent information from
the PATSTAT database of the European Patent Oﬃce.
Our main result is that venture ﬁnance matters for innovation strategies. The arrival
of venture capital is associated with an increase in ’make’ but not in ’buy’ R&D activities,
and with an increase in the ‘make and buy’ R&D strategy. This means that venture
capital favors the build-up of absorptive capacity, and also results in a more regular R&D
eﬀort. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the availability of public funds turns out to increase
all innovation activities. This stands in stark contrast with the eﬀect of venture ﬁnance,
which selectively aﬀects those activities which lead to an increase in absorptive capacity.
We also ﬁnd interesting results for other contextual variables. Consistent with Cassiman
and Veugelers (2006), we ﬁnd that ﬁrm size is associated with more innovation activities,
while ﬁrm age tends to have the opposite eﬀect. Firms in high-technology sectors also focus
on the build-up of absorptive capacity. Finally, we ﬁnd that previous patenting activity,
whether measured by its quantity or its quality, has a positive eﬀect on the undertaking of
innovation activities. This is particularly important, since we cannot observe innovation
activities before the arrival of the venture investor.
One important concern about any study of the eﬀects of venture capital on portfolio
c o m p a n i e si st h a tv e n t u r eﬁrms do not invest randomly, but rather carefully select their
portfolio companies on the basis of their likelihood of success. Therefore, one should
distinguish between the ‘selection’ eﬀect (of a company obtaining ﬁnancing on the basis
of its characteristics) and the ‘treatment’ eﬀe c t( o ft h ev e n t u r eﬁrm activism changing
the company’s situation). We take this methodological issue seriously, and we perform
a ‘propensity score’ analysis which allows us to control for the selection process based
on observable company characteristics.2 We also exploit the fact that for some of the
venture-backed companies in our sample we are able to observe innovation strategies both
2The small size of the Netherlands and the concentra t i o ni no u rs a m p l eo fc o m p a n i e sw h i c hr e c e i v e d
funding after 1997 prevent us to use instrumental variables based on spatial or temporal availability of
funding. Notice that the lack of information on companies before they receive venture funding prevents us
to use a Heckman selection model.
4before and after venture ﬁnancing. We ﬁnd that all our results are conﬁrmed by these
additional checks. Nonetheless, the lack of an instrumental variable which may lead to a
conclusive analysis warrants some caution in the causal interpretation of our results.
In sum, our paper provides new insights into the positive contribution of venture
capital to building successful companies. These ﬁndings are relevant for management, as
venture investors will aﬀect a company’s strategy at an even earlier stage than at the
product commercialization phase one which had been documented so far. They are also
relevant for a more complete evaluation of public policy towards innovating ﬁrms, as they
suggest that encouraging forms of ﬁnance which are conducive to the build-up of absorptive
capacity may be socially more eﬃcient than providing purely monetary support for these
companies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and
the construction or our sample and variables. Section 3 discusses our results. Section 4
examines several robustness checks and is followed by a brief conclusion.
2T h e D a t a
2.1 Data sources
We base our analysis on a unique company-level database of Dutch companies. The
Netherlands presents two characteristics that make it suitable for our purposes. It is the
second European country in terms of patents per capita (European Patent Oﬃce (2004)).
It is also the second largest venture capital market in the European Union in per capita
terms, second only to the UK (EVCA (2007)).
We collect our data from three sources. First, we use innovation and company data
from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Since 1993, the CIS takes place every four
years in all countries of the European Union to investigate companies’ innovation activi-
ties. Information is gathered by national statistical oﬃces through a survey that covers a
representative sample of companies (innovative and not) stratiﬁed along the region, sector,
and size dimensions.3 About 10,000 Dutch companies are included in each survey wave.
CIS data is published only in aggregate form to preserve respondents’ anonymity. How-
ever, qualiﬁed researchers can be granted access to anonymized company-level information
by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). In our case, this consists of data from
three survey ‘waves’: the CIS-3 survey, covering 1998-2000, the CIS-4 survey, covering
3CIS documentation, which provides a full description of the survey, is dowloadable at the URL: http :
//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY _PUBLIC/OSLO/EN/OSLO − EN.PDF.
52002-2004, and the CIS-3.5 survey, covering 2000-2002 and conducted on a subset of the
usual questions.
C I Sd a t ah a v eb e e np r e v i o u s l yu s e di nb o t ht he economics and management literatures.
For instance, Mairesse and Mohnen (2002) and Belderbos et al. (2004) use the Dutch
survey, while Cassiman and Veugelers (2002, 2006), and Veugelers and Cassiman (2004,
2005) use the Belgian survey.
Our second source of data is the VentureXpert database published by Thomson Fi-
nancial. VentureXpert is the main commercial source of venture capital and private eq-
uity investment data, with substantial European coverage from the late 1990s (Da Rin,
Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006)).4 The database is compiled from information provided
directly by venture capital ﬁrms, and contains data at the level of the individual invest-
ment (‘deal’). For the Netherlands it includes (for the period under study) more than
1,000 deals in over 600 companies, originated by over 300 venture ﬁrms.
Our third source is the PATSTAT database recently developed by the OECD and
the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO).5 From PATSTAT we obtain information on all the
individual patent applications ﬁled with the European Patent Oﬃce by Dutch companies.
For each patent application the database reports standard measures of patent quality, such
as backward citations, forward citations, and patent scope (’family size’). To the best of
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study which employs such detailed ﬁrm-level information
for innovations, ﬁnancing, and patent quality.
2.2 Sample deﬁnition
Our sample comprises two sub-samples. One is the set of venture-backed companies which
participated in at least one CIS wave after receiving funding. We have 110 such companies.
In the analysis we lose 19 of them due to missing values of the dependent variables.
The second subset is the control sample of CIS respondents which did not receive
venture funding. We build the control sample balancing two opposite needs. On the one
hand, we want to include as many companies as possible to gain statistical power. On the
other hand, we want to drop companies which are diﬀe r e n ti nn a t u r ef r o mt h o s ew h i c h
receive venture ﬁnancing, as their inclusion would add noise.
We strike a balance by deﬁning our sample as the set of all companies that satisfy (for
4VentureXpert has been used in many studies on venture capital (e.g., Gompers et al. (2006), Hochberg,
Ljungqvist, and Li (2007), and Sørensen (2006)).
5Grid Thoma provided us with patent data matched to individual companies. Information on PATSTAT
is available at the URL: http : //europa.eu.int/estatref/info/sdds/en/pat/pat − epo − nat − sm.htm.
Notice that EPO data refer to patent applications as opposed to patents granted, as in the case of USPTO
data.
6any CIS wave in which they took part) at least one of the following two restrictions: (i)
they introduced an innovation, (ii) they performed some innovation activity (i.e., they used
some innovation input). This means that we include all the ﬁrms which have introduced
an innovation in the CIS wave years, but also those which have used innovation inputs
without introducing an innovation, on the grounds that–due to the relatively short period
covered by a CIS wave–they are likely to do so in a subsequent year.
We also drop all observations in two NACE 2-digit industries in which we do not have
any venture-backed companies (Oil&Energy and Metals), and companies with more than
415,529 euros of turnover (equal to one standard deviation above the average value for
venture-backed companies).
These restrictions bring our control sample from 23,677 to 7,808 companies. In other
words, we eliminate about two thirds of the companies in the CIS which would be unlikely
control units.
2.3 Dataset construction
Building our dataset involved two major steps: aggregating information from diﬀerent CIS
waves for each company, and merging the information from the CIS, VentureXpert and
PATSTAT databases.
2.3.1 Aggregating information across CIS waves
Not all companies present in the CIS participate in each survey wave. In fact, 57% of the
companies take part in only one wave, 28% takes part in two waves, and only 15% in all
three waves, as shown in Table 1. It follows that aggregation is only necessary for less
than half of the sample.
When there is a need for aggregation of information, we consider that companies may
undertake diﬀerent innovation activities over time. It is important to notice that the
t i m i n go ft h eC I Sw a v e si ss o m e w h a ta r t i ﬁcial. Consider a company which starts doing
intramural R&D in December 2000 and buys a patent in January 2001; these two activities
would fall in diﬀerent CIS waves, but are clearly closer than if they had taken place at
two distant dates within the same CIS wave (say February 1998 and November 2000).
Since we do not know the exact timing of each activity, we consider the company actively
engaged in an R&D activity if it is ever active across the CIS waves it takes part in. With
this approach we are able to exploit the richness of our data, which in almost half of the
cases extends over more than one CIS wave. We argue that this allows us to obtain a
better picture of companies’ innovation strategies than a purely cross-sectional dataset.
7Since we want to study how venture capital shapes innovation strategies, for venture-
backed companies we need to take into account the timing of the funding. Therefore, we
consider CIS information only after ac o m p a n y ’ sﬁrst venture funding so as to evaluate
the impact of venture capital on innovation strategies. Unfortunately, we typically do not
have information on innovation strategies both before and after the arrival of the venture
capital, which prevents us to use a potentially useful identiﬁcation strategy.6 However,
in our robustness tests, we analyze the ten venture-backed companies for which we have
both pre- and post-funding innovation data.
Finally, we aggregate patent information. Patent data are collected at the level of
each single application. We aggregate the patent applications made to the EPO by each
company taking into account the year of application. For each company we then compute
the applications in the two years before the ﬁr s tC I S - w a v ei tt o o kp a r ti n t o .F o rv e n t u r e -
backed companies we compute the patent applications during the time period in the two
years before funding. Based on the patent applications falling in these sets, we build our
measures of patent quality.
2.3.2 Merging information from diﬀerent sources
The second major step in building the database consisted of merging the relevant infor-
mation coming from each of the three sources. In other words, we need to match the
information relative to each company so as to ensure that its innovation strategy, venture
ﬁnancing, and patenting data are correctly assigned to it. This is achieved by exploiting
the fact that each Dutch company is assigned a unique ID number by the Dutch Chamber
of Commerce. Crucially, this number is used by CBS to identify companies.
As VentureXpert does not contain this information, we identiﬁed the Chamber of
Commerce data manually on the Chamber of Commerce website, using an algorithm based
on the company name, city, address, and sector. The website of the Chamber of Commerce
makes such information publicly available. By joining the Chamber of Commerce ID of
CIS respondents with that of the venture-backed companies, CBS could provide us with
a precise identiﬁcation of which CIS companies are venture backed. Our sample contains
110 such unique companies. The sample was then anonymized by CBS by substituting
the Chamber of Commerce IDs with random ones.
Finally, identiﬁcation of patent applicants was also obtained using the Dutch Chamber
of Commerce ID. For the patent data we received we applied the same algorithm used for
companies found in VentureXpert and obtained the Chamber of Commerce ID number
6The lack of a panel dimension prevents us to use ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, which would be the optimal solution
to this problem.
8from its website. In this way we were able to precisely assign patent data to each company.
2.4 Variables
In this section we describe all the variables we use in the empirical analysis. Table 2
provides formal deﬁnitions and reports the CIS questions from which innovation activities
and strategies were obtained. In order to avoid measurement error, we make an eﬀort to
use only objective measures from the Survey. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all
dependent and independent variables.
2.5 Dependent variables
Our ﬁrst set of dependent variables is given by the innovation activities within a com-
pany. These are the basic constituents of innovation strategies and consist of individual
innovation processes. We take them from the responses to the CIS. There are two main
innovation activities. One is Make, which is engaging directly in R&D within the ﬁrm
(‘intramural,’ or ‘in-house’ R&D). The other is Buy, which consists of buying innovation
activities performed by other companies or research institutes. Buy, in turn, may consist of
either of two components. One is Buy—R&D, the purchase of extramural R&D activities;
the other is Buy—Know-How, the purchase of external know-how (patents, inventions, or
other disembodied knowledge). We also consider in the analysis that a company may ac-
quire know-how ‘embodied’ in advanced machinery and equipment (Buy—Machinery). We
include this variable because it provides interesting information about companies’ indirect
acquisition of external know-how. However, following Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) we
cautiously choose not to include this variable in the construction of innovation strategies
because it is not clear whether this activity refers to technology acquisition or just to the
purchase of means of production.
Our second set of dependent variables is given by a company’s innovation strategies.
These consists of four mutually exclusive categories deﬁned by the combinations of the
two innovation activities, Make and Buy. The baseline category is No—Make—No—Buy,a n d
corresponds to companies which never engage in innovation activities. Make—Only and
Buy—Only are the strategies of companies which engage in only one of these two activities
in the sample period. Finally, Make—and—Buy is the strategy of combining the internal and
external knowledge acquisition, and corresponds to the build-up of absorptive capacity.
An additional variable of interest is whether a ﬁrm engages in in-house R&D contin-
uously or not. We deﬁne Permanent—R&D as a dummy which identiﬁes companies that
perform in-house R&D continuously during the period covered by the CIS.
92.6 Independent variables
Our set of independent variables is computed at the company level and is obtained from
the Community Innovation Survey, VentureXpert, and the PATSTAT database of the
EPO.
The explanatory variable which is the focus of this study is VC, an indicator variable
for whether the company has received venture ﬁnancing before participating in a CIS wave.
We then consider the importance of alternative ﬁnance for innovative companies, which
are often credit constrained. Innovative companies are particularly likely to be credit
rationed due to the riskiness of their activity, the lack of track record, or the presence of
large agency costs (see Carpenter and Petersen (2002), Hall (2002), and Himmelberg and
Petersen (1994)). In this context, the availability of public funds can be an important
source of ﬁnancing (Hall and van Reenen (2000)). Public—Funds is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the company received public funds, at either the national or the European
level. We obtain this information from the CIS. We want to stress that it is important to
control for the availability of public funds to each company to account for a potentially
diﬀerent role of public and private ﬁnance, and also to take into consideration the possible
correlation of venture ﬁnancing with the receipt of public funds.
Since we do not have information on the pre-funding levels of innovation, it is important
that we control for how innovative a company was before the arrival of the venture ﬁrm.
For this, we use a standard measure of innovation output, patents. Notice that the patent
data we have is particularly suited for this purpose, since it contains the entire universe
of patent applications ﬁled with the EPO, which provide a set of better applications than
those ﬁled at the purely national level (see Hall, Thoma, and Torrisi (2007)). Our main
patent measure (L(Patent—Citations)) is a measure of patent quality widely used in the
literature (see Kortum and Lerner (2002)), the number of 3-year forward citations received
by a company’s patent applications ﬁl e dw i t ht h eE P Ob e f o r et h ey e a ro fi t sﬁrst venture
ﬁnancing (if venture-backed), or before the ﬁrst CIS wave it has responded to (if non
venture-backed). This measure was introduced by Trajtenberg (1990), who found a strong
relationship between the number of patent citations received and the economic importance
of a patent.
Company age is an important variable in determining corporate strategy and the abil-
ity to reach out to external resource providers (Hsu (2006)). We measure company age
(L(Company—Age)), which we obtain from the Business Register database of CBS, at the
time of its ﬁrst venture ﬁnancing (if venture-backed), or at end of the ﬁrst CIS wave it
has responded to (if non venture-backed). Firm size is another factor widely used in the
literature to capture a company’s ability to mobilize resources. We use L(Sales),t h ec o m -
10pany’s turnover in the last year of the ﬁrst CIS wave it took part in (whether or not the
company is venture-backed). For all three continuos variables–patent citations, age, and
size–we use log transformations to account for possible non-linearities of their eﬀects, as
well as to account for the possible presence of outliers.
Previous studies show that R&D orientation aﬀects innovation activities (e.g., Colombo
and Garrone (1996), Röller, Tombak, and Siebert (1997)). We control for this with the
industry a company operates in. For our main analysis we aggregate this information
into a dummy variables which naturally lends itself to interpretation. We deﬁne as High—
Tech the following NACE 2-digit industries: Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Electronics,
Computer Services, and R&D Services. We obtain the necessary information from the
CIS. In the robustness section we replace High—Tech with industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
3R e s u l t s
3.1 Univariate analysis
We start our analysis with some non-parametric tests of the diﬀerence in means (or fre-
quency, for dummy variables), between venture-backed and non ventured-backed compa-
nies, for both dependent and independent variables.
Table 3 reports our results. In the ﬁrst panel we focus on innovation activities. Venture-
backed companies present higher frequencies of all innovation activities (both Make and
Buy), and also permanent in-house R&D. The only exception is the acquisition of ma-
chinery, but–as we argued in Section 2.5–this category is likely to be associated more to
production that to innovation.
We then analyze innovation strategies. Interestingly, venture-backed companies show
as i g n i ﬁcantly higher frequency of the Make—and—Buy strategy, while they present a sig-
niﬁcantly lower frequency for the Buy—Only and the No—Make—No—Buy strategies, and no
diﬀerential eﬀect for Make—Only. This is indicative of a role of venture capital in pushing
the portfolio companies towards building absorptive capacity, a result we are going to
examine more thoroughly in the next section.
With respect to the control variables, venture-backed companies have a higher prob-
ability of receiving public funds than non-venture backed. This could be due to the
certiﬁcation role of venture funding in facilitating the access to public funds. However
another possible explanation is that venture capital may have a preference for companies
that are receiving public subsidies that may further alleviate ﬁnancial constraints.
Finally venture-backed companies are characterized by a larger number of pre-funding
11patent citations, and are more likely to operate in high-tech industries. They are also sig-
niﬁcantly younger and slightly larger. These characteristics suggest that these companies
are more innovative than non venture-backed ﬁrms.
3.2 Multivariate analysis
We move to the regression stage by ﬁrst examining the determinants of companies’ inno-
vation activities. We base our analysis on probit regressions, report the results in Table 4.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that venture ﬁnance has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likeli-
hood of undertaking in-house R&D (Make). It also has a positive eﬀect on the likelihood
of purchasing innovation activities developed outside the company (Buy). This eﬀect is
only marginally signiﬁcant, at a 12% conﬁdence level; however the eﬀect on the two com-
ponents, Buy—R&D and Buy—Know-How, is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Interestingly the receipt of public funding has a positive, and statistically highly signif-
icant eﬀect on all innovation activities. The eﬀect of the two sources of ﬁnance, private
venture capital and public funds, is also sizeable in economic terms. Funding from a ven-
ture capitalist increases the likelihood of Make by 18%, and the likelihood of Buy—R&D
and Buy—Know-How by 9% and 12%, respectively. Receiving public funding increases the
likelihood of Make by 36%, and that of Buy by 21%. Interestingly, public funding, but
not venture funding, also positively aﬀects the likelihood of buying advanced machinery.
There is therefore some indication that public funding helps companies overcome ﬁ-
nancing constraints and increase their spending across the board, while the eﬀect of venture
ﬁnancing appears to be somewhat more selective. We also ﬁnd reassuring that venture
ﬁnancing is signiﬁcant even if we include public funding as a regressor, as this avoids the
possibility that the VC variable captures the combined eﬀect of these two sources of funds.
The results also for our control variables are also interesting. As expected, companies
in high-tech industries tend to make more use of innovation inputs. This eﬀect is quite
strong for Make, with companies in high-tech industry showing a 20% higher probability to
undertake in-house R&D, and weaker and marginally signiﬁcant (at the 10.5% conﬁdence
level, with an economic eﬀect of only 3%) for Buy.W e a l s o ﬁnd that bigger companies
undertake innovation activities more frequently, and that older companies are less active
in innovating than younger ones. Finally, our control for pre-funding patent quality turns
o u tt ob eh i g h l ys i g n i ﬁcant for both Make and Buy. This control aims at helping the
identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of VC, but also brings an interest of its own, as it measures
the quality of a company’s past innovation eﬀorts. We ﬁnd that a one standard deviation
increase in (logarithm of) the number of pre-funding patent citations results in a 12%
increase in the likelihood of Make and in a 4% increase in the likelihood of Buy.
12These results suggest that the direction of venture capital does provide support to the
build-up of absorptive capacity. However, as discussed by Cassiman and Veugelers (2006),
we need to resort to a diﬀerent set-up to obtain direct evidence on this. We therefore
turn to an examination of the eﬀects of our explanatory variables on innovation strategies,
w h i c hw eh a v ed e ﬁned as exclusive combinations of the two innovation activities. By using
a multinomial logit regression, we can then try to identify which factors aﬀect the joint
adoption of Make and Buy, i.e., the accumulation of absorptive capacity. Table 5 reports
the results of our multinomial logit, where we leave the No—Make—No—Buy strategy as
the residual one. The result which stands out is that VC indeed aﬀects (positively, and
signiﬁcantly) the Make—And—Buy strategy, but not the other two strategies (Make—Only
and Buy—Only), conﬁrming that venture ﬁnance does indeed brings portfolio companies
to accumulate absorptive capacity. This eﬀect is also economically signiﬁcant, as venture
ﬁnance increases the likelihood of Make—And—Buy (compared to the baseline case of no
innovation activity) by 18%.
An interesting ﬁnding comes from the comparison of the eﬀect of private venture fund-
ing with that of public funds. While VC has a selective eﬀect on alternative combinations
of innovation activities, and thus an eﬀect on the innovation strategies of portfolio com-
panies, the availability of public funds simply results in an across-the board increase in
innovation activities. In other words, public funds are just money, which does not dis-
criminate across innovation activities. Venture capital, on the contrary, comes with an
additional strategic inﬂuence. This is a novel and relevant ﬁnding which contributes to
the debate on the economics of public subsidies to R&D (see Hall and van Reenen (2000)
for a discussion). The other explanatory variables are found to have less discriminat-
ing eﬀect on innovation strategies than venture capital. Like public funds, also ﬁrm size
indiscriminately raises the probability to undertake any innovation strategy (relative to
none at all). Patent citations, company age, and high-tech industry are associated with a
higher likelihood of both Make—Only and Make—And—Buy, suggesting that younger ﬁrms
with more past patent citations and which operate in high-tech industries rely more on
in-house R&D than on the purchase of externally produce innovation activities.
Finally, we consider whether the presence of venture capital, beyond leading to the
build-up of absorptive capacity, also results in companies engaging in R&D in a more
continuous way. For this, we exploit a question of the CIS, which asks respondents which
have engaged in Make activities whether they have done so continuously or occasionally
over the three years covered by the Survey. Table 6 reports the results of a probit regres-
sion where we look at the determinants of the choice to undertake in-house R&D on a
continuous basis. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of VC is positive and highly signiﬁcant, leading
13to an increase of the likelihood of permanent R&D equal to 13%. We interpret this as fur-
ther evidence in favor of venture capital having an important strategic impact on portfolio
companies.
Overall, our results are largely consistent with previous studies of innovation activities,
and point to a diﬀerent role of private venture capital and public funds for innovative
companies. This has clear implications for both strategic management and for public
policy. Companies receiving venture ﬁnance will receive more than just money, and the
contribution of this form of specialized ﬁnancial intermediation includes an inﬂuence on
the fundamental choice of innovation activities. Receiving public funds, on the other hand,
is mainly a way to alleviate ﬁnancing constraints. From a policy perspective, we provide a
new element for the evaluation of public policies. If venture ﬁnancing favors the build-up
of absorptive capacity and public funds do not, this should be given due consideration in
the evaluation of public policy for innovative companies.
4 Robustness checks
We undertake several robustness checks. First, we consider that our data reﬂect strategic
choices observed at diﬀerent points in time, but we treat them as a pure cross-section. We
therefore want to explicitly control for the time dimension of the data, and for the fact
that we sometimes aggregate them over a diﬀerent number of CIS waves. To this purpose,
we build a set of seven dummies, one for each possible combination of CIS waves (see Table
1). We therefore have dummies identifying whether the value of the dependent variable of
a particular observation was built using only CIS—3, only CIS—3.5, only CIS—4, both CIS—
3 and CIS—3.5, both CIS3—5 and CIS—4, both CIS—3 and CIS—4, or using all CIS waves.
Table 7 reports the results that remain similar to the ones reported in Tables 4 to 6. More
precisely, a diﬀerence is that there are now no eﬀects of VC on any of the Buy activities,
and that the statistical and economic signiﬁcance of VC in the multinomial logit, while
still clearly positive, is slightly reduced. This is not surprising, and is actually comforting,
given that several of the CIS wave dummies turn out to be signiﬁcant, conﬁrming that
our robustness check was warranted.
Second, following Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), we include in our main regressions
a measure of innovation intensity (deﬁned as the ratio of total expenditures on innovation
activities relative to sales). We expect this variable to increase the likelihood of all inno-
vation activities. In fact, we ﬁnd that innovation intensity increases the likelihood of all
innovation activities, except Make. More importantly, the eﬀect of VC remains the same
as in our main regressions, as reported in Table 8. Both Tables 7 and 8 show a substantial
14stability of all the estimated coeﬃcients and of their standard errors, conﬁrming that our
main model speciﬁcation is not very sensitive to these additional controls.
We undertake additional robustness exercises.7 First, we run our regressions adding
a company-level measure of reliance on basic R&D. This variable intends to proxy for a
company’s reliance on more basic types of know-how, and therefore is a likely determinant
of the build-up of absorptive capacity (Cassiman and Veugelers (2006)). However, this
measure is only available for the CIS—3 and CIS—4 waves, and therefore regressions are
r u nw i t hf e w e ro b s e r v a t i o n s . 8 We ﬁnd that the addition of reliance on basic R&D–which
turns out to positively aﬀects the likelihood of the Make—And—Buy strategy–does not
change the eﬀect of VC found in our main model.
Second, we exploit the additional information present in our patent data, and we build
two alternative measures of patent quality. One is the logarithm of the number of the sum
of 3-year backward and forward citations a company’s patent applications with the EPO.
The other is the logarithm of the number of patents granted by non-EPO patent oﬃces
to a company’s patent applications with the EPO. Both variables are built as L(Patent—
Citations), and are widely used in the literature (see Hall, Thoma and Torrisi (2007)).
All of our results remain valid, and with these alternative patent quality measures the
Buy innovation activity, that was marginally signiﬁcant in our main regressions, becomes
insigniﬁcant, further stressing the diﬀerential eﬀect of venture capital on a company’s
choice of innovation of activities.9
Finally, we replace High—Tech with industry dummies. Most of our results are the
same, except that VC now becomes signiﬁcant in increasing the likelihood of the Buy
innovation activity, and loses signiﬁcance as a determinant of the likelihood of undertaking
permanent R&D.
4.1 Accounting for selection biases
It is possible that a company’s attitude towards innovation strategies is not only de-
termined by the presence of a venture investor, but also aﬀects the investor’s choice to
provide ﬁnance in the ﬁrst place. Our sample does not lend itself to the use of a spatial
or temporal-based instrument. The Netherlands is a small country, preventing us from
7We choose not to report these additional regressions for the sake of brevity, but results are available
upon request.
8The CIS—3 and CIS—4 include the following question: ‘How important to your innovation activities were
each of the following sources?’ Possible choices are: internal sources, customers, suppliers, competitors,
consultants, universities and higher educational institutions, government and public research institutes,
conferences, etc. Within each category respondents choose the extent to which the source is important:
not used, slightly important, important or very important.
9Also a simple count of the number of patent applications ﬁled with the EPO give identical results.
15using ﬁrm location as an instrument, as used by Baker and Gompers (2004) among others.
We cannot use exogenous variation of venture ﬂows either, since most of the ﬁnancing in
our sample takes place after 1997, when a surge in venture funding occurred. A diﬀerent
methodology seems more appealing in our context, namely the use of a ’propensity score’
for the receipt of venture ﬁnancing (Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983)).
Propensity score matching employs a predicted probability of group membership10,
e.g., treatment versus control group, based on observed predictors, obtained usually from
a logistic regression. The propensity score can then be used for matching the ’treated’ units
to a suitable set of control units. This methodology therefore allows to correctly estimate
the eﬀect of a ’treatment’ variable (in our case venture capital) on the relevant dependent
variables, provided that the exposure to treatment can be considered to be purely random
among observations that have the same value of the propensity score. In other words, the
assumption is that selection occurs only on observable characteristics–on which, in fact,
the propensity score is calculated. While this is clearly a ‘heroic’ assumption whose results
should be taken with more than a grain of salt ,i ti so f t e nu s e di ne m p i r i c a ls t u d i e sa s
a way to test the robustness of regression results and to reduce possible selection biases.
The result is the ‘average treatment eﬀect,’ or ATT, which is the estimated eﬀect on the
dependent variables of the variable of interest (, or ’treatment,’ VC in our case), which
takes into account that assignment to the treatment is caused by diﬀerent values of the
propensity score.
We employ the widely used Kernel method to match on the basis of the propensity
score. This method relies on taking each treated unit and matching it with a weighted
average of all controls with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between
the propensity scores of the treated and the control units (see Becker and Ichino (2002)).
Table 9 reports the ATT and the corresponding t-statistic. We report results based
on all the explanatory variables, including the ones we added in the robustness checks
(reliance on basic R&D, innovation intensity, and CIS wave eﬀects) in order to increase
the number of observables on which the propensity score is calculated, therefore potentially
increasing the accuracy of the ATT estimate.
The matching based on the propensity score supports all our previous ﬁndings. Specif-
ically, the average treatment eﬀect for all activities is signiﬁcantly positive, except for
the acquisition of machinery. Moreover, in relation to strategies, the average treatment
eﬀect is only positive and signiﬁcant for Make—And—Buy, providing support for our conjec-
ture that venture capital plays a key role in the build-up of absorptive capacity. Finally,
10The propensity score is deﬁned as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given pre-
treatment characteristics.
16propensity score matching also supports the hypothesis that venture capital increases the
likelihood of permanent in-house R&D eﬀorts.
We also notice that concerns of selection are less compelling when dealing with strate-
gies, as in our case, than when dealing with outcomes like the venture-backed company’s
ability to reach IPO status or becoming proﬁtable. In the case of strategies the argument
for selection is less compelling, as it is less clear that company characteristics, which lead
to a positive selection by a venture ﬁrm, should also determine its future strategies. Still,
we are aware that our main results should be interpreted with the due caution.
We undertake a last exercise to provide some additional support for a causality eﬀect.
There are a few companies, speciﬁcally ten, for which we have innovation information
before and after the arrival of the venture capitalist.11 We then look at the distribution
of strategies before and after the VC arrival, which we report in Table 10. We notice
that after the arrival of the venture capitalist, the company that had chosen the Buy-Only
strategy does not make any changes. However the two companies that had chosen the
Make-Only strategy and the ﬁrm that employed the No-Make-No-Buy strategy changed
to the Make—And—Buy strategy, bringing the number of companies in this latter category to
nine after funding. Though we understand that this result relies on very few observations,
and that it could be argued that the venture capitalist anticipated that these companies
were moving towards a Make—And—Buy strategy, we think that it still provide evidence
consistent with a causality eﬀect.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we provide new insights into how venture capital contributes to building
successful companies. Building on the literature about the role of absorptive capacity
as a source of competitive advantage, we investigate whether venture capital aﬀects the
innovation strategies of portfolio companies.
We ﬁnd that these appear to beneﬁt from expanded ﬁnancial resources, which increase
their innovation eﬀort. More importantly, we ﬁnd that venture capitalists selectively push
portfolio companies towards choosing innovation activities which result in the accumula-
tion of absorptive capacity, and towards more permanent in-house R&D eﬀorts. Venture-
backed companies rely more on a Make–and—Buy strategy, rather than on Make—only or
11Speciﬁcally, these companies have the following characteristics: a) they did not receive any funding
before 2001 and, b) they either received VC funding during the years 2001 and 2002, and they participated
in CIS—3 (pre-VC funding period) and also in CIS—3.5 and/or CIS—4 (post-VC funding period); or they
received VC funding during the years 2003 and 2004, and they participated in CIS—3 and/or CIS—3.5
(pre-VC funding period) and also in CIS—4 (post-VC funding period).
17Buy—only strategies.
Interestingly, our results hold after accounting for the availability of public funds.
Moreover, we ﬁnd a clear diﬀerence in the role of (private) venture ﬁnancing and public
funding, as the latter relaxes ﬁnancial constraints but does not provide any additional
strategic guidance. This provides novel evidence on the special role of venture funding in
driving companies towards successful innovation strategies. From a policy perspective, our
results suggests that venture capital may be beneﬁcial not only for individual companies,
but may also play an important role in fostering economic growth.
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23Table 1
Sample composition by CIS wave
This Table reports the distribution of observations across CIS waves for our whole sample.
Companies Percentage
CIS 3 only 1,859 23.8
CIS 3.5 only 950 12.2
CIS 4 only 1,661 21.3
CIS 3 and 3.5 only 925 11.8
CIS 3 and 4 only 447 5.7
CIS 3.5 and 4 only 798 10.2
CIS 3, 3.5, and 4 1,168 15.0
Total 7,808 100.0Table 2
Variable Deﬁnitions
This Table provides formal deﬁnitions for all dependent and independent variables.
Innovation Variables
Variable Description CIS Survey question
Innovation Activities
Make Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company
has engaged in intramural R&D in any CIS
wave it took part in; 0 otherwise.
Did your enteprise engage in intramural
R&D (‘creative work undertaken within
your enterprise to increase the stock of
knowledge and its use to devise new and
improved products and processes’)?
Buy Dummy equal to 1 if the company pur-
chased extramural R&D or know-how in
any CIS wave it took part in; 0 otherwise.
Buy—R&D Dummy equal to 1 if the company pur-
chased extramural R&D in any CIS wave
it took part in; 0 otherwise.
Same activities as above but performed by
other companies or research organizations
and purchased by your company.
Buy—Know-How Dummy equal to 1 if the company pur-
chased know-how (patents, inventions, or
other disembodied knowledge )in any CIS
wave it took part in; 0 otherwise.
Purchase or licensing of patents or non-
patented inventions, know-how and other
types of knowledge from other enterprises
or organizations.
Buy—Machinery Dummy equal to 1 if the company pur-
chased advanced machinery, equipment or
software in any CIS wave it took part in; 0
otherwise.
Acquisition of advanced machinery, equip-
ment and computer hardware or software
to produce new products or services.
Innovation Strategies
Make—Only Dummy equal to 1 if the company engaged
only in Make activities in all CIS wave it
took part in; 0 otherwise.
Buy—Only Dummy equal to 1 if the company engaged
only in Buy activities in all CIS wave it
took part in; 0 otherwise.
Make—And—Buy Dummy equal to 1 if the company if the
company engaged in both Make and Buy
activities in some CIS wave it took part in;
0o t h e r w i s e .
No—Make—No—Buy Dummy equal to 1 if the company did not
engage in either Make nor Buy activities in
any CIS wave it took part in; 0 otherwise.
Permanent R&D
Permanent—R&D Dummy equal to 1 if the company engaged
in intramural R&D in a continuous way
throughout the three years of any CIS wave
it took part in; 0 otherwise.
Did your ﬁrm perform in-house R&D con-
tinuously or occasionally during the years
covered by the CIS?Control Variables
Variable Description
VC Dummy equal to 1 if the company received venture ﬁnance; 0
otherwise.
Public—Funds Dummy equal to 1 if the company received public funds (tax cred-
its, grants, subsidized loans, loan guarantees), from national or
European agencies, in any CIS wave it took part in; 0 otherwise.
L(Patent—Citations) the number of 3-year forward citations received by all patent ap-
plications of a company ﬁled with the EPO before the year of its
ﬁrst venture ﬁnancing (if venture-backed), or before the ﬁrst CIS
survey it has responded to (if non venture-backed).
L(Company—Age) Logarithm of 1 plus the age of the company at the time of its ﬁrst
venture ﬁnancing (if venture-backed), or at end of the ﬁrst CIS
survey it has responded to (if non venture-backed).
L(Sales) Logarithm of 1 plus the company’s turnover in the last year of the
ﬁrst CIS wave it took part in.
High—Tech Dummy equal to 1 if the company operates in one of the following
NACE 2-digit industries: Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Electron-
ics, Computer Services, and R&D Services; 0 otherwise.Table 3
Samples Comparison
This Table reports mean values (frequencies for dummy variables) and standard deviations for all dependent and independent
variables, for both the sample of venture-backed and control sample of non venture-backed companies. Variables are deﬁned
in Table 2. We also report the p-value of a two-tailed test of diﬀerence in means.
Venture—backed Non venture-backed
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. p-value
Innovation Activities
Make 0.802 0.400 0.612 0.487 0.000
Permanent R&D 0.808 0.397 0.684 0.465 0.008
Buy 0.615 0.489 0.443 0.497 0.001
Buy—R&D 0.549 0.500 0.344 0.475 0.000
Buy—Know—How 0.352 0.480 0.250 0.433 0.048
Buy—Machinery 0.438 0.501 0.587 0.492 0.362
Innovation Strategies
Make—Only 0.220 0.416 0.258 0.437 0.382
Buy—Only 0.033 0.179 0.089 0.285 0.004
Make—And—Buy 0.582 0.496 0.354 0.478 0.000
No—Make—No—Buy 0.165 0.373 0.299 0.458 0.001
Control Variables
VC 1.000 0.000 —
Public—Funds 0.657 0.468 0.329 0.470 0.000
L(Patent—Citations) 0.121 0.425 0.026 0.216 0.036
L(Company—Age) 1.933 1.290 2.563 0.963 0.000
L(Sales) 9.893 2.246 9.232 1.800 0.006
High—Tech 0.417 0.496 0.159 0.366 0.000
Number of observations 91 7,717Table 4
Innovation Activities
This Table reports results of probit regressions. The dependent variables are innovation activities. Variables are
deﬁned in Table 2. For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis)
computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.














































































Observations 6,531 6,531 6,531 6,531 6,531
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.01
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Table 5
Innovation Strategies
This Table reports results of a multinomial logit regression. The categorical dependent variables are the four inno-
vation strategies, with No—Make—No—Buy being the residual category. Variables are deﬁned in Table 2. For each
independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-






















































Model p-value: 0.000Table 6
Permanent versus Occational R&D
This Table reports results of a probit regression whose dependent variable is Permanent—R&D,d e ﬁn e di nT a b l e2 .
For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using
(Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed

























Model p-value 0.000Table 7
Robustness: Accounting for CIS Waves and Time Eﬀects
This Table reports results of probit and multinomial logit regressions, where we add to the main models a set of
dummies for each combination of CIS waves, deﬁned in Section 4. The dependent variables are innovation activities
and strategies, and the permanent R&D dummy. Variables are deﬁned in Table 2. For each independent variable, we
report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
Innovation Activities















































































Observations 6,531 6,531 6,531 6,531 6,531
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.04




















































Observations 6,531 6,531 6,531
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.10 0.10


























Model p-value 0.000Table 8
Robustness: Adding R&D Intensity
This Table reports results of probit and multinomial logit regressions, where we add to the main models the R&D—
Intensity variable, deﬁned in Section 4. The dependent variables are innovation activities and strategies, and the
permanent R&D dummy. Variables are deﬁned in Table 2. For each independent variable, we report the estimated
coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
Innovation Activities

























































































Observations 6,518 6,518 6,518 6,518 6,518
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.01


























































Observations 6,518 6,518 6,518
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.09




























Model p-value 0.000Table 9
Propensity score
This Table reports results of propensity score matching for all our dependent variables, which are deﬁn e di nT a b l e
2. For each independent variable, we report the number of treated and control unites which are matched using the
Kernel method, the resulting Average Treatment Eﬀect (ATT), and its t-statistic. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
Number of Number of Average
Treated Controls Treatement Eﬀect t-statistics
Make 64 5,041 0.227*** 4.73
Buy 64 5,041 0.183*** 3.21
Buy—R&D 64 5,041 0.217*** 3.39
Buy—Know-How 64 5,041 0.135* 1.96
Buy—Machinery 64 5,041 0.019 0.28
Make—Only 64 5,041 0.016 0.32
Buy—Only 64 5,041 —0.126*** —3.42
Make—And—Buy 64 5,041 0.211*** 3.23
Permanent—R&D 64 5,041 0.182*** 4.23Table 10
Pre-Post Analysis
This Table reports the distribution of innovation strategies for those observations for which we have information both
before and after the arrival of venture ﬁnancing. Variables are deﬁned in Table 2
Before VC After VC
No—Make—No—Buy 10
Make—Only 20
Buy—Only 11
Make—And—Buy 69
Total 10 10